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I
What are financial markets and 
why do they exist?
The Financial System
• The financial system is the system that allows the transfer of money between savers
[in economic terms: surplus spending units (SSUs)] and borrowers [in economic
terms: deficit spending units (DSUs)]
• through the financial system monetary resources are allocated in a more efficient
way by transforming savings into more productive investments. By doing so, the
financial system promotes economic growth and development
• the financial system carries out its function through three components:
ü financial assets (= the medium by which the value of financial transactions
within the financial system is recognized)
ü financial institutions (= entities performing financial functions: banks and
other financial intermediaries)
ü financial markets (= institutions in which the creation, sale and transfer of
financial assets may take place)
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The role of  financial Institution and regulated market
• Theoretically, the transfer of money could take place directly between SSUs and
DSUs
• In the real world, three formidable obstacles obstruct a direct transfer
• differences in preferences (e.g.: short term and low risk investment vs. long term
and high risk investment)
• transactions costs (e.g.: search and information; policing and enforcement)
• information asymmetries (and their consequences: moral hazard and adverse
selection)
• The presence of  financial institutions allows to manage such problems
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The role of  banks
• Banks manage differences in preferences by borrowing short term and lending long term (in
economic terms: asset and maturity transformation)
• through banks original lenders are insulated from the risk of borrowers’ insolvency (in
economic terms: credit risk) and final borrowers get financed according to their needs
• Banks manage transaction costs by their economies of scale
• because banks deal with many lenders and many borrowers, the average cost for
matching unit falls progressively
• Banks manage informationasymmetries by their specialization
• their expertise and relationship-based approach allows banks to collect and elaborate
information more easily
• Two important implications:
• banks’ profit is based on the difference (in economic terms: spread) between the interest
paid on deposits and the interest received on loans
• the asymmetry between deposits and loans brings about a structural risk of instability;
thus, maintaining reserves to satisfy the demand for deposits’ return is crucial
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The role of  capital markets
• Capital markets allow money to flow directly from SSUs to DSUs, thus:
• avoiding the cost of banking intermediation
• shifting credit risk on original lenders and requiring matching of preferences
• Transaction costs and information asymmetries are managed in different ways:
• financial intermediaries (in economic terms: investment services providers and
collective-investment schemes managers)
ü arrange transactions more cheaply by their economies of scales and
specializations;
ü signal the quality of relevant financial assets by pledging their reputation
• secondary markets, often regulated (in economic terms: exchanges), provide
liquidity, thus allowing diversification and communicating information
• regulation increases transparency and manages agency problems (in particular
when financial assets are risk capital)
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Banks and Markets. Key features (1)
• From both a theoretical and a historical perspective, financial system may be more
bank-oriented or centred (in economic terms: relationship based systems) or capital
markets-oriented (in economic terms: arm’s length systems)
• Relationship based systems
• Key features:
ü transactions are conducted on the basis of a direct and generally long-term relationship;
ü the lender has information about the borrower which is not available publicly;
ü lender has direct influence on the borrower and monopolistic power in the market; as a
consequence, weaker role for price signal
• Key implications:
ü better forms of insurance, at the cost of reducing access to financing
ü better performance when markets and firms are smaller, legal protection is weaker, there is
little transparency and innovation is mostly incremental, rather than revolutionary
ü greater government intervention, which is made less costly and less transparent
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Banks and Markets. Key features (2)
• Arm’s length systems
• Key features:
ü parties involved have no special information about each other
that is not already available to the general public
ü open competition among lenders; as a consequence, stronger role
for price signal
• Key implications:
ü greater access to financing, at the cost of greater exposure to
shocks
ü better performance when markets and firms are bigger, there is
better legal enforcement and transparency, innovation is mostly
revolutionary
ü government intervention is more visible and, thus, more difficult
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The regulation background and techniques
• Law translates background social policies or political principles (e.g.: truth,
fairness, efficiency, democracy) into a grid of legal directives that
decision-makers in turn apply to particular facts.
• These mediating legal directives take different forms that vary in the relative
discretion they afford the decision-maker.
• rules require or prohibit specific behaviours and bind a decision maker to
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts
• standards tend to collapse decision-making back into the direct application of
the background principle
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Main features of  regulation
• Securities regulation around the world is characterized by two main features
• the presence of a regulatory strategy specifically designed for financial
markets, which is based on both rules and standards
• a significant delegation of rule-making power from the legislative power (= the
Parliament) to independent administrative agencies (e.g.: securities
commission)
• In the European Union, securities regulation is mostly based on EU directives and 
regulations
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European “citizenship” of  regulation
• The FSAP received further impetus by the law-making reforms contained in the
report delivered in early 2001 by a Committee of Wise Men constituted by the
Council
• After finding the inability of the harmonized structure to cope with market
developments, the report underlined the failure of EC legislative procedures to
deliver regulation quickly and effectively
• a new model for law making, which was quickly endorsed by the 2001 Stockholm
European Council
• According to the 2007 review, the new law making model appears to be satisfactory
for both the institutions and the stakeholders
• shorter timeframes for the adoptionof legislation
• better working relationshipsbetween the institutions
• a greater level of transparency
• much closer engagements by market participants in the law making process
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Delegation of  rule making power
• law making power in securities is often delegated by the Parliament to
independent administrative agencies. The rationale for such a delegation is twofold
• in a complex matter as securities regulation, which deals with ever changing and
more technical problems, Parliament is both (1) too slow and (2) unable to do its job
• independent agencies, instead, are better equipped to cope with these issues, because
they have both (1) the flexibility and (2) the technical expertise to do that
• such an approach is problematic
• independent administrative agencies (1) are more subject to influence by concentrated
interests than members of Parliament, and (2) lack political responsibility
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Lacks in Harmonization 
• Cross border activities are typically affected by market failures, including (1)
regulatory costs and inefficiencies represented by multiple regimes, and (2)
externalities generated by wellbeing-influencing effects occurring in one State as a
result of an activity which occurs in another State
• Harmonization is normally regarded as the strategy to fix the problem. Moreover,
harmonization (1) can support mutual trust between regulatory regimes, and (2) limit
the extent to which national regulators impose regulation on non national markets
actors
• Harmonization has, however, a number of disadvantages. More in detail, harmonization :
• requires political agreement which may considerably slow the process, with the consequent
adoption of standards which rapidly become obsolete (even though international standard setting
bodies need to be taken into consideration)
• restricts regulatory innovation, which is typically incubated at a national level
• is vulnerable to regulatory capture, especially when standards emerge from bodies with insecure
governance and accountability foundation
• Regulatory competition is not an option in the new FSAP scenario of centralized regulation
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All we need is disclosure
• Informationasymmetries introduce adverse selection into capital markets
• in the primary market, a firm (1) may be willing to pass up profitable investment opportunities
because the return required by uninformed investors is too high, or (2) has to under-price its
securities to ensure the participation of uninformed investors in the offering.
• in the secondary, an uninformed (or less informed) investor may worry about trading with a
privately (or better informed) investor; as a result, the former may lower (increase) the price at
which he is willing to buy (sell) to protect against the losses from trading with the latter. This
form of price protection when buying or selling shares (1) introduces a bid-ask spread into
secondary share markets, and (2) reduce the number of shares that uninformed investors are
willing to trade. Both effects (1) reduce the liquidity of share markets, (2) impose trading costs on
investors for which they need to be compensated through a higher required rate of return, and
thus (3) increase the cost of capital
• Such a market failure may be corrected by disclosure
• in the primary market, disclosure may favour optimal asset allocation for the investor and lower
the cost of capital for the firm
• in the secondary market, disclosure may increase market liquidity by leveling the playing field
among investors, thus lowering the cost of capital
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The role of  financial intermediaries
• Financial intermediaries play a critical role in the operation of capital markets
• by reducing transaction costs and the impact of informational asymmetries, they provide a
crucial market-access channel for investors (SSUs) and capital seekers (DSUs)
• a strong intermediary sector has been associated with financial development and economic
growth
• In more precise terms, financial intermediaries
• on the SSUs’ side, act as a bridge between investors and the securities markets
ü brokerage and distribution services
ü discretionary portfolio management
ü investment advice
• on the DSUs’ side, facilitate market access for companies seeking capital
ü underwriting
ü own-account trading
ü corporate finance advice
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Regulation ratio
• Under both the current EU legal system and the Commission’s approach to regulatory design
post-FSAP, regulation is justified only as a mean to correct market failures
• With specific reference to financial intermediaries, two broad themes may be identified
• informational asymmetries between investors and intermediaries justify investor protection,
aimed at (1) protecting of investors, on an individual basis and in the interest of wider investor
confidence, and (2) supporting financial intermediaries in signalling their credibility to investors
• negative systemic externalities justify prudential regulation aimed at bolstering the soundness of
financial intermediaries and thus preventing systemic wide financial crises
• These two dominant themesare closely related and present a different degree of relevance
• investors are protected by the promotion of soundness and confidence in the market-place
contribute to systemic stability
• in general, financial intermediaries are more prone to information-based market failures than they
are to market failure which are primarily concerned with systemic risk
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Regulatory techniques
• regulatory techniques used in financial intermediaries regulation may be divided into
four categories:
• access regulation or authorizations controls
• through a licensing process by an objective supervisor, provide a quality-assurance mechanism, which
(1) relieves the investors of the burden of elaborating complex information represented by the
financial intermediary, and (2) protects investors and market integrity by weeding out in advance
financial intermediaries, which may be incompetent, fraudolent or unable to meet their commitments
• protective regulation
• focused on the relationship between the investor and the financial intermediary, imposes on the
conduct of the financial intermediary standards of good behaviour, which are designed to protect the
investor against the imbalances in the relationship with the financial intermediary
• prudential supervision
• seeks to ensure the soundness of the financial intermediaries in order to protect both (1) the assets of
the investors, and (2) the wider stability of the financial system against the risk of systemic failure
• compensation schemes
• act as a safety net against failures of regulation and may provide redress for the investors
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The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
• The regulation of the investment services is provided, under almost all aspects, by the 2004
Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
• The MiFID regime is multi-layered
• the Level 1 Directive was adopted in April 2004 (= Directive 2004/39/EC)
• the Level 2 Directive was adopted in October 2006 (= Directive 2006/73/EC)
• CESR has adopted a range of Level 3 measures (e.g. guidelines to competent authorities on
inducements and passporting)
• MiFID reflects both (1) the wider support for market finance and financial markets




• With the exception of activities carried out through a branch, MiFID liberalizes investment-
services markets by subjecting a financial intermediaries to the regulatory system of its home
Member State, regardless of where it carries out its activities
• MiFID grants a regulatory and supervisory “passport” to financial intermediaries authorized in
their home Member States to provided investment services in any other Member State, without
the need for re-authorization…
• … an therefore eliminate the host Member State in ongoing regulation. In particular, conduct
of business regulation remains with the home Member State, save with respect to activities
carried out through a branch, which are subject to the hostMember State regulation
• The scope of MiFID intervention is defined through a functional, rather than an institutional,
approach
• regulation applies to the provisions of investment services, and it is not dependent on the
organizational or legal status of the financial intermediaries
• investment services are identified through combining a catalogue of services with a catalogue
of financial instruments. Both are listed in theAnnex I of the Level I Directive
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The prudential regulation
• Prudential rules are concerned with risk management and address those areas where financial
intermediaries’ capital, client money and public confidence may be put at risk
• In those areas which are not covered by the authorization requirements or by different
regulation (e.g.: initial and ongoing capital adequacy), MiFID prudential regulation adopts a
principle-based approach to support the calibration of regulatory requirements to the firm’s
risk profile
• MiFID prudential regulation covers
• outcome driven organizational prudential rules aimed at imposing flexible risk management
standards with respect to internal organization (e.g.: senior management; compliance function)
• asset protection and record keeping obligations
• conflicts of interest management
• rather than at their elimination or disclosure, MiFID regulation aims at managing conflicts
of interest through ex ante outcome driven organizational requirements (= e.g.: requiring
appropriate level of independence)
• successful management of conflicts of interest will depend on supervisory authority, in
terms both of an effective public enforcement and supervisory practices
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The protective regulation
• Investor protection is controversial
• in general terms, characterization of investor protection range from it being an outdated and
unfashionable concept (= the need of protection for unsophisticated investors is “as
unsophisticated as the investors it is supposed to protect”: Easterbrook-Fischel, 1999) to it
enjoying a central position as a core determinant of investor trust which drives strong markets
• in the EU context, the debate is clouded by the vulnerability of investor protection by hijacking
as a political cover for protectionism
• In the light (1) of the current deeper policy engagement with the retail market, and (2) of the
2008 financial crisis, new arguments have been added in favour of investor protection
• investor protection is a good in itself, supporting investor trust and reflecting social values
concerning honesty and greed
• investor protection re-balances the effects of investors bounded rationality and poor decision-
making
• While also prudential regulation, compensation schemes, and general private law (including
contract and consumer law) may be considered as protective regulation, in the EU context
investor protection tends to be identified with the rules aimed at regulating the relationship
between the financial intermediary and the investor.
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Conduct of  business rules
• Conduct of business rules impose the financial intermediaries standards of behaviour on secondary
market practices and transactions
• MiFID conduct of business rules
• are largely regarded as means to ensure that investors “are reasonably able to understand the
nature and risks of the investment service and of the specific type of financial instrument that is
being offered and, consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis” (art. 19, par.
3, Level 1 Directive)
• go beyond disclosure to intervene more closely in the relationship between the financial
intermediary and the investor, considering both the latter’s bounded rationality and his reliance on
the financial intermediary in its gatekeeper’s function
• appear to reflect two major models of the EU retail investor
ü the investor as risk tolerant capital supplier
ü the investor as risk-averse, prudent, saver (or consumer)
• the influence of both models on the regulatory design drives certain inconsistencies, particularly
with respect to the balance between disclosure and interventionist fiduciary-duty-style obligation
for the financial intermediaries
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The main principles
• Based on a foundation obligation to “act honestly, fairly and professionally in
accordance with the best interests” of the financial intermediary clients” (art. 19,
par. 1, Level 1 Directive), the conduct of business regimes covers the life cycle of
the relationship between the investor and the financial intermediary
• marketing [obligation to (1) fair, clear and not misleading information (2) and
marketing disclosure]
• initial disclosure [= obligation to provide information about (1) the investment firm
and its services; (2) financial instruments and proposed investment strategies; (3)
execution venues, and (4) costs and associated charges]
• suitability assessment (= know your customer rule and suitability or appropriateness
assessment, unless execution only regime applies)
• execution and order handling (in particolar: best execution duty)
• on going record-keeping
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The clients’ classification: Retail and Professional
• Aiming at an effective containment of costs, the conduct of business regime takes
into consideration the different need of protection in the retail and wholesale sector
• the distinction between retail and professional investor identifies the scope of mandatory
rules (e.g.: initial disclosure regime), with a further exemptions related to “eligible
counterparties” (e.g.: banks and other financial intermediaries )
• professional investors may bargain for both a stronger and a lighter protection
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Banking Union
Banking Union – What is Banking Union?
• The BANKING UNION indicates both a framework in which banking-
sector policy is pooled at the European level, and the process of
transition to such a framework from the prior situation in which
banking-sector policy was mostly national.
• 28-29 June 2012 (Brussels EuroArea Summit), at which the critical
decision to centralise supervisory authority within the ECB was made.
The decision to complement this with European- level arrangements for
bank resolutions was announced at a later summit, in December 2012.
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Banking UNION – keywords
• Banking Union… is also known as: 
1. “Centralized Supervision” 
2. “Bail in”
• Banking union is mainly defined by two of these policies, known as..
• the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and
• and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
• The core of the SSM is the transfer of the power to grant or withdraw banking licenses and
of related supervisory duties from national authorities in the euro area to the ECB
• The SRM will centralise much, but not all, of the decision-making process for the resolution
(an administrative alternative to court ordered insolvency) of non-viable banks, granting a
key role to another new organisation, the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which, under
certain conditions, will be able to draw resolution financing from a Single Resolution Fund
(SRF).
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Banking Union – The third pillar
• In November 2015 the Commission adopted a proposal to set up a European
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for bank deposits in the euro area.
• EDIS would provide a stronger and more uniform degree of insurance cover
in the euro area. This would reduce the vulnerability of national DGS to large
local shocks, ensuring that the level of depositor confidence in a bank would
not depend on the bank’s location and weakening the link between banks and
their national sovereigns.
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Banking Union – Legal Basis and Geographical Scope
• Legal Basis:
• CRR/CRD IV package – Capital requirements – Prudential regulation
• BRRD – Bank crisis regulation – orderly way to wind it down
• DGSD – Common guarantee for retail customers
• At the moment, 19 member states of  the euro area fall under the scope 
of  SSM and SRM
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(I) Banking Union – Single Supervisory Mechanism
• From 2009 European System Financial Supervision (“ESFS”)…
• ESMA	  EBA	  EIOPA
• … to SSM: as the financial crisis involved and turned into the Eurozone 
debt crisis in 2010/2011, at least for those countries which shared the 
Euro as a currency and were even more interdependent, more had to be 
done, in order to break the vicious circle between banks and national 
finances.
• The SSM has been created by virtue of  Regulation (EU) n. 1024/2013 of  
October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of  credit institutions.
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(I) Banking Union – Single Supervisory Mechanism
• Objective: Achieve uniform application of the common rules of
prudential supervision.
• SSM has taken on the role as ultimate prudential supervisor of all 6000
banks in EURO area
• SSM directly supervises the systemically important banks of the
Eurozone, and is responsible indirectly, through the national supervisory
authorities, for the prudential supervision of all other banks.
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(I) Banking Union – Significant Institution
• The ECB can decide at any time to classify a bank as significant to ensure that 
high supervisory standards are applied consistently.
• To qualify as significant, banks must fulfil at least one of  these criteria
1. Size the total value of  its assets exceed €30 billion
2. Economic importance: for the specific country or the EU economy as a whole
3. Cross-border activities: the total value of  its assets exceed €5 billion and the ratio of  
its cross-border assets/liabilities in more than one other participating Member State to 
its total assets/liabilities is above 20%
4. Direct public financial assistance: it has requested or received funding from the 
European Stability Mechanism or the European Financial Stability Facility
A supervised bank can also be considered significant if  it is one of  the three most 
significant banks established in a particular country.
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(II) Banking Union – Single Resolution Mechanism
• The commitment to banking union had another short-term impact
• from bank bailouts the reimbursement by governments of all creditors of failing
banks, and even in some cases of shareholders towards a default recourse
• to ʻbail-inʼ the forced imposition of losses on creditors and other claimants to
finance a non-viable bank’s orderly resolution
• Effects:
• reduced the perception of contingent government liabilities arising from
problems in individual countries’ banking systems,
• further contributing to the reduction of the bank-sovereign vicious circle.
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(II) Banking Union - Single Resolution Mechanism
“banks may be global in life, but they are national in death” 
• It is very doubtful that the EU policy shift from bailout to bail-in could have occurred so
comprehensively in the absence of the banking union. A strong common decision-
making framework for bank was necessary to overcome the firmly rooted belief of many
national banking policymakers that the imposition of bail-in in a single bank failure would put all
ʻtheirʼ banking champions at a competitive disadvantage.
• During the first five years of the financial crisis in Europe from mid-2007 to mid-2012,
banking nationalism prevented national public authorities from adequately addressing the
systemic problem of weak bank balance sheets, and led them to an almost universal
preference for regulatory forbearance in order not to put ʻtheirʼ champions at a
competitive disadvantage
• This misalignment of the incentives of public authorities with their prudential mandate goes a
long way to explain the failure of successive EU-wide stress testing exercises in 2009,
2010 and 2011 to restore confidence, because the crucial balance sheet assessments
remained in the hands of national authorities
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(II) Banking Union - BRRD
• The Directive 2014/59/UE (Bank recovery and resolution directive)
• Apply to a wide range of  institutions:
• Credit institutions
• Investment firms (subject to capital requirements CRR/CRD IV)
• Financial Holding Companies
• Apply to European Economic Area not to EU Member States as a whole.
• Three Pillars of  BBRD
1. Recovery and Resolution Plans
2. Early intervention measures
3. Resolution and Resolution tools
37
38
(III) Banking Union – Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive
• From Directive 94/19/CE to Directive 2014/49/UE (DGSD) ….why is
it necessary to protect the depositors? 
• DGSD 
• from “minimum” to “maximum” harmonisation
• from the local to pan-European scheme
• The beneficiary
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